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"All men by nature desire knowledge."
-- Aristotle, Metaphysics, bk. 1, ch. 1.
It has been the tendency of philosophers in the Twentieth Century to 
examine the philosophy of Immanuel Kant in parcels, by analyzing key Kantian 
concepts, arguments, and distinctions without relation to the architectonic 
to v/hich they belong. Thus, for example, large bodies of literature are 
devoted exclusively to Kant's distinction between analytic and synthetic 
judgments, to his conception of Categories, and to his argument that existence 
is not a predicate. The elucidation and employment of isolated Kantian ideas 
has greatly enhanced many contemporary philosophical theories, particulaxly 
in epistemology, and manifests the enormous debt owed Kant by modern thinkers. 
On this basis alone it is no exaggeration to state that Kant's influence on 
the development of philosophy is as extensive as that of any philosopher 
since Plato and Aristotle. But Kant's contribution to philosophical thought 
should not be restricted to the utility of his ideas distinct from the 
Critical Philosophy as a whole. Kant's systematic account of human knowledge 
in the Critique of Pure Reason, brilliant if not completely satisfactory, 
merits attention and criticism in it's own right. In the Critique Kant 
forges from ideas unprecedented in the history of philosophy a philosophical 
edifice which purports both to establish conclusively the validity of scien­
tific knowledge of the sensible world, and to refute just as conclusively 
claims that reason can provide knowledge of objects beyond the bounds of 
possible experience. That Kant's success in this endeavor is not complete 
is neither suprising nor detrimental to the value of his philosophical system. 
What is suprising is the fresh and unique approach he brings to the problem
of human knowledge, and the nearness which that approach brings him to 
solving the problem.
Kant's philosophy is best understood as an attempt to reconcile British 
empiricism with Continental rationalism, Locke and Hume with Descartes and 
Leibniz. Beginning with Descartes, European philosophers became preoccupied 
with questions of what knowledge is and how it is obtained. Concurring with 
the ideas of Descartes, the rationalist philosophers maintained that certain 
fundamental propositions, for example, that Gk)d exists, or that the soul is 
immortal, can be known a priori through the use of reason, without reference 
to sense experience. According to the rationalists, such propositions are, 
or are deduced from, innate ideas or principles, and many rationalist phil­
osophers constructed elaborate deductive philosophical systems a priori on 
these fundamental principles. On the other hand, the empiricist school, 
whose philosophy achieved its most consistent formulation with Hume, an older 
contemporary of Kant's, argued that all knowledge is derived from sense im­
pressions, that the mind without experience is, in Locke's words, a "tabula 
rasa," possessing no knowledge whatsoever. Kant recognizes fundamental pro­
blems with both rationalist and empiricist accounts of knowledge. The empir­
icist thesis that there is no idea without a corresponding sense impression 
is, as Hume showed, tantamount to an admission that knowledge of the external 
world is impossible, a position which, to Kant anyway, is not very satisfying 
philosophically. The problem with rationalism is nearly the opposite; phil­
osophers who supposed that they had a priori knowledge made such various and 
often conflicting claims about the content of that knowledge that any claim 
to a priori knowledge had to be met with skepticism.
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Kant is quite unprepared to accept the skeptical conclusions of Humean 
empiricism as well as the extravagant claims of the rationalist school. That 
he knows many propositions about the world Kant is not inclined to doubt.
His Critical Philosophy is not constructed to prove that he knows, rather to 
explain how it is possible to know what he knows. But Kant restricts the 
scope of what he knows, and of what is possible to know, to propositions 
connected with experience, denying the rationalist thesis that reason alone 
is capable of obtaining knowledge of objects which could not possibly be 
experienced, and claiming that all arguments which purport to establish such 
knowledge through the use of reason unaided by experience involve fundamental 
logical fallacies. Kant avoids the skepticism of empiricism and the fallacies 
of rationalism by claiming that a limited number of synthetic propositions 
can be known a priori, but that such propositions cannot be known without 
reference to experience. These propositions are known prior to experience 
because experience itself is impossible without their being time. The fact 
and nature of human experience verifies the truth of certain propositions 
about the world a priori.
Kant's idea that all humans possess a priori knowledge of certain pro­
positions which both refer to experience and make experience possible is a 
novel one in the history of philosophy. It is an admirable, if not completely 
successful effort to distill out and combine crucial elements of both the 
rationalist and empiricist traditions into a theory of knowledge which has 
none of the implausible or unsatisfying consequences of those traditions.
In order to make sense of his idea, Kant presents in the Critique an elaborate 
and lengthy exposition explaining how a particular perceptual and conceptual
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apparatus of the hunan mind, from which can derived a priori knowledge, 
is required for humans to have experience at all. Humn beings, according
to Kant, do and must perceive and conf'#»-!wo +u^ n ^ a..F c dna conceive the world through specific nodes
which consitute the subjective form*? n-rj uxve iorms ol experience, and without these forms
there could be no content in exoerienrp x iexperience, or at least no knowable content.
Kant maintains that through these forms of experience phenomena are organized
spatially and temporally by a faculty which he calls "pure intuition." and
concepts are categorized according to twelve fundamental concepts, derived
from the laws of logic, by the faculty of "pure understanding." Following
the outline of the Critique, it is my intention in this paper to explicate
the perceptual and conceptual faculties Kant presents, show how Kant derives
^ principles from the relation of the two faculties, and finally, in
the last section of the paper, evaluate the significance of the Critical
Philosophy to modern philosophical inquiry.
Kant makes a sharp distinction between the faculty of perception and 
the faculty of intellection, and this distinction serves as the basis for 
the division of his account of the possibility of experience in the Gritique 
into the Transcendental Aesthetic" and the "Transcendental Analytic." In 
the Aesthetic Kant argues for the ideality of space and time, maintaining 
that space and time do not exist in themselves, or at least not necessarily.
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Space and time are "pure intuitions," contributed by the perceiver accordi 
to Kant, actively projected onto reality as the subjective forms of all 
appearances. In arguing thus, Kant supports a theory of perception dras 
tically different from traditional theories which consider perception to 
be the mind's passive reception of the effects of external, objects on the 
senses. For Kant, the forms of perception, space and time, are not received 
but imposed, and this being the case, space and time have no existence except 
in the perceptual apparatus of human beings.
To prove that space and time are subjectively imposed forms, and not 
real existents, Kant presents two types of arguments, "metaphysical" and 
"transcendental." The metaphysical arguments are based on analyses of the 
nature of space and time, and the transcendental arguments, vdiich are epis­
temological in character, are based on the possibility of a priori mathematics 
The arguments regarding space and time parallel each other and are, with 
minor variations, essentially the same. I will therefore, for the sake of 
brevity, discuss only the arguments intended to prove that space is an a 
priori form, and of the four metaphysical arguments regarding space, I will 
discuss only the second, which seems the most convincing. It is as follows;
Space is a necessary a priori representation, 
which underlies all outer intuitions. We can never 
represent to ourselves the absence of space, though 
we can quite well think it empty of objects. It 
must therefore be regarded as the condition of the 
possibility of appearances, and not as a determination 
dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation 
which necessarily underlies outer appeairances. ^
Kant s idea is that space must be a concept based on a priori intuition 
because it cannot be abstracted from experience in the way a posteriori 
concepts can. One can abstract virtually all properties in a given perception
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and still imagine that one is perceiving, but one cannot abstract space from 
any perception because to do so would make perception impossible. Thus, Kant 
argues, space is not an a priori part of experience, but an a priori con­
dition for the possibility of experience.
The metaphysical arguments may establish that space and time are unique, 
different from a posteriori concepts abstracted from experience in the sense 
that there could be no experience except in space and time. To show that experi­
ence is possible only in space and time is the object of the metaphysical 
arguments, but these arguments do not show that space and time are subjective.
To prove that space and time are pure intuitions, a priori perceptual forms 
imposed on reality by the perceiver, Kant relies on transcendental arguments.
In the section of the Critique entitled "The Transcendental Exposition of 
the Concept of Space," Kant argues that space must be subjective because 
that is the only way to account for the necessity and strict universality 
of Euclidean geometry. Kant assumes, with Newton, that space is Euclidean, 
considering that the principles and axioms of Euclidean geometry are synthetic, 
and are apodeictic in their application to space. Realizing that the necessary 
truth and universal application in the field of experience of the principles 
of Euclidean geometry cannot be explained by induction fiom empirical data,
Kant concludes that the apodeictic nature of the principles of geometry is 
possible only if the perceiver imposes an Euclidean spatial structure onto 
the world. If, as Kant maintains, it is the nature of the perceiver to 
experience phenomena in Eluclidean space, the principles of EJuclidean geo­
metry are a priori and universally valid, because a non-spatial or non- 
Euclidean perception would be impossible.
Kant's conclusion that human beings, by nature, impose spatial and 
temporal structure5onto the world has some important implications about
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the nature of the sensible world. If space and time are but subjective 
forms of perception, then what is perceived in space and time is not in 
a sense, what is really there. Kant must take a position which distinguishes 
the phenomenal world, the world of appearances in space and time, from the 
noumenal world, a world vriiich is somehow responsible for the empirical con 
tent of appearances, but which is fundamentally unknowable because it is not 
capable of subsumption under the perceptual and conceptual apparatus of the 
human mind. The perceptual and conceptual forms through which man views 
the world necessarily limit the field of possible experience, and therefore, 
in Kant's view, the field of possible knowledge, to that which is in space 
and time. Since the noumenal world is outside of space and time, it can be 
neither experienced nor known.
Kant may therefore be termed an idealist. In his view, objects of 
perception do not exist independently of being perceived because it is only 
through perception that objects acquire spatial and temporal characteristics. 
But he thinks his idealism is of a much different sort than that of any of 
his predecessors. Kant maintains that he is only a "transcendental idealist " 
since he is also an empirical realist: "We assert, then, the empirical 
space (and time), as regards all possible ... experience; and 
yet we also assert (their) transcendental ideality" (72, his italics). By 
this apparently paradoxical statement Kant means to distinguish his view 
from other idealisms, for example that of Berkeley, which, according to 
Kant, "regards the things in space as merely imaginary entities" (244).
For Kant space and time are not "merely imaginary," but are empirically real 
because the common forms through which all humans perceive appearances make 
those appearances objective. Yet appearances are transcendentally ideal
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because they are not things in themselves --  they do.not exist independently
of the perceiver. Without the subjective forms there would be no space and 
time, nor would there be appearances. There would be only the mysterious 
noumenal world.
Whether or not by positing the forms of experience and distinguishing 
between phenomena and noumena Kant succeeds in making his idealism any less 
imaginary than those of his predecessors is a question I will return to in 
Section V, after considering the conceptual apparatus of the Critical Phil­
osophy. For now, what is important to notice is that in the "Transcendental 
Aesthetic" Kant has laid the groundwork for and made considerable progress 
in constructing a .theory of human experience which precludes empirical skep­
ticism and shows the claims by rationalists to knowledge beyond the bounds 
of possible experience to be untenable. By idealizing space and time as 
subjective forms Kant is able to deduce certain necessary and a priori pro­
positions, for example the principles of Euclidean geometry, which the problem 
of induction prevents empirical realists from claiming as knowledge. At the 
same time, the field of perception, restricted to appearances in space and 
time, will, when combined with a conceptual scheme which is relative only 
to that field, limit the scope of possible knowledge to propositions about 
empirical reality and render invalid all rationalist claims to transcendent 
metaphysical knowledge.
Although a distinction between the faculty of perceptual intuition and 
the faculty of intellection is crucial to Kant's exposition, it is only
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through a combination of both faculties that kmowledge is possible. According 
to Kant, "Intuition and concepts constitute ... the elements of all our know­
ledge, so that neither concepts without an intuition in some way corresponding 
to them, nor intuition without concepts, can yield knowledge" (92). In 
the "Transcendental Aesthetic" Kant has revealed the perceptual side of his 
account of human experience, but before he can explicate the relation between 
the perceptual and the conceptual form which knowledge is derived, Kant must 
consider in detail the nature of the conceptual apparatus involved in this 
relation. Kant is convinced that, just as there must be pure intuitions basic 
to human perceptivity, there also must be "pure concepts" basic to the human 
understanding which, though divorced from all empirical content, provide the 
form of all experience, and without which there could be neither experience 
nor knowledge. To the discovery and elucidation of these concepts Kant 
devotes the section of the Critique entitled "Analytic of Concepts."
Kant finds a "clue" to the discovery of these concepts in Aristotelian 
logic, thought in Kant's time to be a conclusive and nearly complete system 
of knowledge. A concept, for Kant, is a "common representation," applicable 
to a number of particulars, and through which those particuleirs are related 
to each other. Concepts are essential to judgments, the objects of logical 
analysis, because making a judgment requires knowledge of a concept's applic­
ability to a particular, or to another concept. Noting that Aristotelian 
logic abstracts all content from concept and particular, ascertaining the 
bare forms of judgments, ie. the types of relations which "give unity" to 
the undetermined components of judgments, Kant considers that an analogous 
"transcendental logic" may be constructed which has "lying before it a 
manifold of a priori sensibility, presented by transcendental aesthetic.
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as material for the concepts of pure understanding" (ill). Unlike "general" 
logic, which is entirely empty of content, this transcendental logic would 
contain some conceptual material, namely the concepts of space and time 
and vrtiat is entailed by them, and would be therefore of significant aid in 
explaining the principles of order in the phenomenal world, though its valid 
application would be necessarily limited to that world.
At the basis of his framing of the transcendental logic is Kant's con­
viction that the conceptual forms of experience are somehow correlated to 
or determined by the logical forms of judgments. According to Kant, "The 
same function which gives unity to the various representations in a judgment 
also gives unity to the mere synthesis of various representations in an 
intuition; and this unity, in its most general expression, we entitle the 
pure concepts of the understanding" (112, his italics). Kant's conviction 
is curious, for it is not clear why one should suppose that formal logic 
could provide a clue for a logic that will account for the conceptual 
structure of the phenomenal world, but it is also convenient, because in 
the transcendental logic "there arise precisely the same number of pure 
concepts of the understanding which apply a priori to the objects of intui­
tion in general, as ... there have been found to be logical functions in all 
possible judgments" (113)* Employing an only slightly modified Aristotelian 
logic, Kant lists in the "Table of Judgments" twelve forms of judgments, 
which he believes are the only forms possible, and then, in a corresponding 
table, lists the twelve pure concepts of the understanding, in what he believes 
to be an "exhaustive inventory" (113) of the powers of the human understanding. 
Following Aristotle, Kant calls these pure concepts "Categories," and main­
tains that the Categories, analogous to the subjective perceptual forms of
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space and time, constitute the modes through which man necessarily conceives 
his world.^
Kant's Table of Categories is almost certainly unsatisfactory. First, 
even if he could show the validity of deriving the Categories from the 
logical forms of judgments, his list of the pure concepts of the understanding 
would be inadequate because since Kant's day the science of logic has pro­
gressed to the recognition of many more forms of judgments than Kant was 
aware of. Indeed, some philosophers argue that the number of such forms is 
indeterminant, which would entail, given Kant's belief, an indeterminant 
number of categories as well. Second, Kant's list of categories may be 
criticized for being too static. That the human conceptual apparatus may 
evolve, admitting new pure concepts and discarding others, seems at least 
possible, but such a possibility Kant does not allow. But more important 
than the inflexibility of the Categories, and their relation to the laws 
of logic, is the crucial function the Categories play in the Critical Phil­
osophy: why their employment is necessary for human experience to be possible, 
and how an understanding of them discloses the fundamental fallacies in both 
rationalism and empiricism. To an examination of these considerations I 
now turn.
According to Kant, the Categories "are concepts of an object in general, 
by means of which the intuition of an object is regarded as determined in 
respect of one of the logical functions of judgment. " (128). As concepts 
of the highest degree of generality, the Categories not only apply to all 
possible objects of perceptual intuition, but serve to organize and differ­
entiate those objects as well. The understanding is for Kant a set of rules, 
the most basic of which are the Categories, by which men must conceive the
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phenomenal world, and which consequently determine the limits to what men 
can possibly experience, and coordinate and order that which they do exper­
ience. That, for example, the world is organized in terms of cause and effect 
is, in Kant's view, a necessary truth determined by the conceptual apparatus 
of human beings, specifically by the category of causality. Though logically 
possible since no contradiction is entailed, an uncaused event is nevertheless 
impossible in the experienced world because the human understanding has ordered 
reality so that all events are caused. The Categories thus determine funda­
mental and necessary rules to which phenomenal objects, ie. all objects in 
space and time, must conform. In contrast to empiricists vrtio must induce 
nature's ordering principles from observed phenomena, Kant is able to attribute 
to such principles the necessity which he thinks they so obviously possess by 
making them subjective. To Kant, "the understanding is something more than a 
power of formulating rules through the comparison of appearances; it is 
itself the lawgiver of nature" (148).
In order to understand the significance of the Categories to the Critical 
Philosophy, and to ultimately make sense of Kant's astounding claim that the 
Categories are necessary for experience to be possible, it is important to 
remember that for Kant all experience contains both perceptual and conceptual 
elements. Experience, in Kant, involves both the intuiting of raw phenomenal 
data in space and time, and the ordering of that data in a way intelligible 
to the human understanding through the use of concepts. Without the con­
ceptual element, experience, if it could occur at all, would be "merely 
a blind play of representations, less even than a dream" (139)* Kant 
maintains that perceptual intuition by itself presents one only with a 
"manifold of intuitions," a chaotic disarray of sense data which, in order
-12-
to be considered experience, must be organized, invested with "synthetic 
unity" through the employment of concepts. The Categories are not, of 
course, the only concepts capable of synthesizing the manifold of intuitions 
— there are empirical concepts, derived from experience, which perform 
a similar task. But being the most fundamental and general rules to which 
all experience must conform, the Categories determine the scope of that 
experience from which the less general empirical concepts are acquired, by 
imparting synthetic unity on the manifold of all intuitions so that experi­
ence is intelligible only through them.
A proper appreciation of the understanding's role in experience requires» 
according to Kant, that the synthesis of the manifold of intuition be analyzed 
into three separate, though interdependent stages. Kant maintains that there 
is "a threefold synthesis which must be found in all knowledge; namely, the 
apprehension of representations as modifications of the mind in intuitions, 
their reproduction in imagination, and their recognition in a concept" (I30, 
his italics). The first stage, the "synthesis of apprehension," involves 
the ordering of an intuition which is "contained in a single moment" (131). 
Since every intuition contains a manifold of phenomenal data, it is necessary, 
according to Kant, that insofar as the intuition is to be regarded as a single 
unified object, the intuition "must first be run through and held together" 
(131)1 that is it must be imparted with synthetic unity by the concepts of 
the understanding.
The synthesis of apprehension is, however, by itself insufficient for 
the attainment of coherent experience, for such experience requires not only 
that the intuition of a single moment be "held together," but also that the 
intuitions of successive moments be connected tlirough concepts. Without
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consistent connections according to conceptual rules betvreen the intuitions 
of successive moments, the passage of time would present to the perceiver 
an hodge-podge of separate intuitions which, though in themselves quite 
coherent, would render, for example, persistence through time of even the 
commonest phenomenal objects beyond the capacity of humans to experience.
Thus, according to Kant, intuitions, as well as being synthesized separately 
in particular moments, are connected together by reproducing in the imagination 
the intuitions of previous moments, in a process Kant calls "The Synthesis of 
Reproduction in Imagination." If one "seekfs] to draw a line in thought" (133)t 
to use Kant's example, one must be capable of reproducing in imagination the 
preceding parts of the line in order to achieve an image of the line as a 
whole. If, on the other hand, a person
were always to drop out of thought the preceding 
representations (the first parts of the line, the 
antecedent parts of the time period, or the units 
in the order represented), and did not reproduce 
them while advancing to those that follow, a com­
plete representation would never be obtained; none 
of the above-mentioned thoughts, not even the most 
elementary notions of space and time, could arise 
(133).
Consistency and continuity in experience are possible, in Kant's view, only 
through the imagination's reproduction of prior intuitions.
It is important to stress that the synthesis of apprehension in intui­
tion, the synthesis of reproduction in imagination, along with the synthesis 
of recognition in a concept, are not merely empirical syntheses, that is, 
they do not merely order phenomenal data received by the senses, but also 
have a completely a priori employment, because these thiree stages of synthesis 
provide the pure (non-empirical) intuitions of space and time with the syn­
thetic unity they require to be objects of experience. This pure and a priori 
synthesis of the manifold is of the utmost consequence to the Critical Phil-
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osophy, because, as will become clear as I explicate the third stage of 
the threefold synthesis, that of recognition, Kant maintains that a pure 
and a priori synthesis of the manifold in pure intuition according to the 
Categories is necessary in order to have consciousness of oneself as a 
unitary being persisting through time — a consciousness vdiich in turn 
is a prerequisite for the possibility of experience.
The final stage of Kant's threefold synthesis is the "synthesis of 
recognition in a concept," a synthesis which involves a person's conscious 
recognition of the other two stages. "If we were not conscious that vdiat 
we think is the same as what we thought a moment before," Kant maintains, 
"all reproduction in the series of representations would be useless" (133)* 
Though the manifold of intuition has been synthesized through apprehension 
and reproduction, there can be no experience, in Kant's view, unless the 
individual is conscious of the syntheses his mind performs. Intuitions 
need to be reproduced in imagination in order to achieve continuity in 
experience, but the manifold cannot attain the unity required for experience 
to be possible unless the mind is aware both of what it is, and that it is, 
reproducing. Kant imagines himself engaged in the act of counting to ilus- 
trate this final stage of synthesis:
If, in counting, I forget that the units, which now 
hover before me, have been added to one another in 
succession, I should never know that a total is being 
produced through this successive addition of unit to 
unit, and so would remain Ignorant of the number.
For the concept of the number is nothing but the con­
sciousness of this unity of synthesis (13^)*
The synthesis of the manifold is not complete then, until the mind is aware 
of its acts of synthesis, and it is this awareness, attained only in virtue
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of the prior acts of synthesis, which constitutes, according to Kant, the 
concept of the object of synthesis.
The close relation between concepts and the mind's awareness of its 
own acts of synthesis is the basis for Kant's argument in the "Transcen­
dental Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding" that the mere 
consciousness of oneself as a unitary being entails the existence and valid 
application of the Categories. According to Kant, the consciousness involved 
in the synthesis of recognition entaUs a unity of the conscious self, because 
the acts of synthesis recognized must emanate from the same self as the one 
from which the recognition emanates. When the recognition is a priori, as 
it is in the understanding's synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition 
into the concepts of space and time, the concepts employed in bringing about 
the synthetic unity recognized must be a priori as well, and not derived 
ftom experience, because the experience from which any a posteriori concepts 
might be derived would fall within the bounds of the as yet unsynthesized 
concepts of space and time. Neither can the consciousness of self as a 
unitary being in this a priori recognition depend on the empirical intro­
spection by which one perceives his inner thoughts and feelings since, Kant 
argues, the concept of time is a formal requirement of such introspection.
The units of consciouness essential to the synthesis of the manifold of pure 
intuition is what Kant calls "transcendental apperception," and is a logical 
requirement which can tell us nothing about the self a priori except that 
it is single and unified.
In the Transcendental Deduction Kant attempts to show from the fact 
that trancendental apperception obtains, the Categories may be derived. 
Apperception, it will be remembered, is logically necessary in order for
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validity. Nevertheless, what the Transcendental Deduction- may show is 
that experience requires a unitary consciousness, that a unitary conscious­
ness requires that diverse intuitions be connected together with concepts, 
and that since an original or initial connection of intuitions presupposes 
concepts by means of which the connection is attained, there must be cer­
tain concepts basic to the human understanding which render experience 
possible.
If the Deduction does in fact show that there are concepts fundamental 
to the human understanding, without which experience is impossible, Kant 
has done a great deal to reconcile the tenets of rationalism and empiricism 
into an epistemology which retains the strengths of both schools, while 
banishing some of their more disturbing consequences. With the rationalists 
Kant agrees about the legitimacy of a priori concepts, because, he maintains, 
certain such concepts must be presupposed for there to be experience. But 
unlike the rationalists, Kant holds that these concepts, in constituting 
the bounds of possible experience, have valid application only within those 
bounds, and that any employment of these concepts to attain knowledge which 
transcends the limits of i)ossible experience is spurious. Indeed, Kant 
devotes over one third of the Critique, an entire section entitled the 
"Transcendental Dialectic," to showing the fallacies of applying the 
Categories to objects outside of possible experience, criticizing, for 
example, the traditional arguments for the existence of God as depending 
on invalid applications of the Categories. For Kant, it must be stressed, 
experience, and therefore knowledge, requires a perceptual as well as a 
conceptual element, and any claim to knowledge which disregards either of 
these two elements is little more than deception. According to Kant,
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’•our pure concepts of the understanding as well as our pure intuitions 
extend to nothing but objects of possible experience, consequently to 
mere things of sense, and as soon as we leave this sphere, these concepts
3retain no meaning whatsoever. ”
By restricting the scope of knowledge to the "mere things of sense,"
Kant manifests his affinity to the empiricist school, and his interest in 
setting firm foundations for empirical investigation of the phenomenal world. 
Kant realizes that for empiricism to get off the ground, to glean any know­
ledge at all from the external world, certain conceptual presuppositions 
must be made which cannot be proven empirically. Without such presuppositions 
the empiricist will inevitably follow Hume down the road to complete skep­
ticism with regard to knowledge, and will be, in the end, unable to provide 
justification for the basic principles upon which science proceeds. Kant*s 
endeavor in the Critique of Pure Reason can be seen as an attempt to show 
that the a priori assumptions of science are valid ones, and this he does 
by showing that without the subjective forms of pure intuition, space and 
time, and without the pure concepts of the understanding, the Categories, 
there could be no experience to investigate empirically. By accounting for 
the possibility of experience, Kant fixes the principles whereby experience 
can be known. Kant, I think, is an empiricist who understands that empiricism 
is untenable without a small dose of rationalism.
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The Categories are the forms through which humans necessarUy conceive 
the world, but these forms, derived as they are from the laws of logic, are 
abstractions of the highest degree of generality, void of any sensible con­
tent, and completely isolated from any instances in perception to which they 
apply. In order to account for the possibility of knowledge, Kant thinks 
that a connection between these pure abstractions and the phenomena of sense 
must be estaolished, that the scope and nature of each category's reference 
must be determined. Knowledge, for Kant, involves the making of true judg­
ments, and to make a true judgment, it will be remembered, requires that 
one correctly apply a concept to a particular. The application of an em­
pirical concept to a particular phenomenal object presents little theore­
tical difficulty since the rules of reference for an empirical concept are 
determined by the phenomena from which the concept is abstracted. Kant sees 
a problem, however, in determining the objects to which categorical concepts 
refer, because, unlike empirical concepts, the Categories are a priori and 
original, not derived from a body of particulars which would serve to delin­
eate the sorts of things they encompass. Lacking the built-in reference 
which empirical concepts possess, the Categories, Kant recognizes, are in 
danger of having no reference at all.
In his chapter on "Schematism" Kant confronts this danger by attempting 
to show how the various categories can refer to paxticular aspects of the 
phenomenal world. Acknowledging that the "pure concepts of understanding 
(are) quite heterogeneous from empirical intuitions" (180), Kant reasons 
that for the Categories to have "significance" to the data of perception, 
something must be interposed between the Categories and intuition, similar
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in some respects to both, and through which the two are connected.
"Obviously," states Kant'
there must be some third thing, which is homogeneous 
on the one hand with the category, and on the other 
with the appearance, and which thus makes the appli­
cation of the former to the latter possible. This 
mediating representation must be pure, that is, void 
of all empirical content, and yet at the same time, 
wile it must be in one respect intellectual, it 
must in another be sensible. Such a representation 
is the transcendental schema (181, his italics).
The transcendental schema, then, provides the medium through which the pure 
concepts of understanding are joined to perception, thereby giving the 
categories reference and concrete meaning in the sensible world.
Kant argues that "an application of the category to appearances becomes 
possible by means of the transcendental determination of time" (181), that 
is, by means of a synthesis of the manifold of pure intuition into the concept 
of time. Such a determination is "homogeneous with the category" (181) through 
its dependence on the category for synthetic unity, and "homogeneous with 
appearance, in that time is contained in every empirical representation of 
the manifold" (181). For Kant, time, th2x>ugh its dependence on the Cate­
gories for coherence as a concept, and through its necessity as a concept 
for ordering the manifold of intuition, is an essential part of the schematic 
link between the Categories and perception. In providing this link, and thus 
securing a reference in intuition for pure concepts, the transcendental deter­
mination of time also imposes an inexorable limit on the meaningful application 
of the Categories. Granted a concrete significance by time, the Categories 
can be applied meaningfully only in time, and are therefore of aid in gaining 
knowledge solely in the phenomenal world, and are incapable of contributing
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to knowledge of the noumenal world, the world beyond the subjectively 
imposed forms of space and time.
But there is more to a transcendental schema than the concept of time, 
for although the heterogeneous offspring of understanding and intuition are 
connected through it, time, in itself, does not provide the unique meaning 
of individual categories. For a schematic exhibition of the reference of 
each category in its individuality, Kant calls in the faculty of imagination, 
and here he is at his most obscure. Kant maintains that the imagination 
produces a single a priori "representation" for each category by "an act 
concealed in the depths of the human soul" (I83). This mysteriously gen­
erated representation, the schema, defines a determinate body of possible 
appearances capable of subsumption under a category. In producing a schema 
the imagination restricts the scope of a category's application, and at the 
same time gives the category a distinct and useful interpretation, by pro­
viding an a priori representation of the category's significance in the 
phenomenal world. But this representation the schema of a category, "can 
never be brought into any image" (I83), since, though it is not as indefinite 
as the category, it must, in its generality, encompass a number of appear­
ances and imaiges, all of vdiich could not possibly by subsumed under a single 
image. Kant, however, not only finds the production of a schema mysterious, 
but he apparently finds the very nature of a schema mysterious as well. Only 
three pages after he denies that a schema can be a specific image, he states 
that "(T)he schema is, properly, only the phenomenon, or sensible concept, of 
an object in agreement with the category" (186), plainly implying» contrary 
to his above assertions, that the schema of a category differs according to 
the particular phenomenon to which the category is applied.
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Kant is correct to recognize, in his "Schematism" chapter, a problem 
in fixing a meaningful application for the Categories in the phenomenal 
vrorld, for it is not easy to see how pure concepts, generated byithe^mindv 
and in no way derived from or dependent on the senses, can have reference 
to a determinate type of phenomena. Kant is also correct to recognize that 
such an application must be fixed for the Categories to be of any aid in 
gaining knowledge of the world in the form of judgments. But aside from 
the vague notion that a schema "mediates" between category and perception» 
iCant fails to solve the problem of schematism. He fails to show how it is 
possible that each category has a phenomenal reference. Instead of worrying 
ibout being "further delayed by a dry and tedious analysis" (183)» Kant 
vould have done well, I think, to have dealt with the problem of schematism 
jn. greater depth, and to have subjected the problem to the same insightful 
jcrutiny he employs throughout most of the Critique with such remarkable 
•esults.
Assuming, with Kant, that the problem of schematism has been solved, 
owever, Kant has now provided all the requisite tools for making synthetic 
udgments a priori. He has explained the formal characteristics of the 
henomenal world in the "Transcendental Aesthetic," demonstrated the existence 
f pure a priori concepts in the Transcendental Deduction, and connected 
hese concepts to the phenomenal world by showing "the sensible condition 
nder which alone the pure concepts of understanding can be employed" (179) 
n the "schematism." Having fulfilled these requirements, Kant's "task now 
3 to exhibit, in systematic connection, the judgments which understanding... 
3tually achieves a priori" (188). Kant thus proceeds to derive from the 
Jhematized Categories nine synthetic judgments, which he calls the "princi-
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pies of pure understanding," in sections of the Gritique entitled "Axioms
of Intuitions," "Anticiiwitions of Perception," "Analogies of Experience,"
and "Postulates of Empirical Thought," These principles, idiich include,
4for example, the principle of Permanence of Substance and the principle 
of Univeral CJausation,•^ are, in their derivation from the Categories, both 
"the a priori principles of possible experience," and "at the same time 
universal laws of nature."^ They axe, in Kant’s view, the necessary rules, 
in the form of judgments, to which all experience must conform if there is 
to be experience at all. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine 
in detail Kant’s derivation of the principles of pure understanding. Suffice 
it to say that just as the pure concepts of understanding are required for 
e3q>erience to be possible, the principles are required for knowledge of that 
experience to be possible. The principles constitute the a priori judgments 
which, in Kant’s view, must be presupposed in order to account for the pos­
sibility of making any synthetic judgments whatsoever, since "they contain 
in themselves the grounds of other judgments" (188),
Kant’s philosophy brings a unique perspective to the theory of knowledge. 
Rather than asking how it is that we can know principles like, for exanple, 
"all events have causes," Kant asks what would happen if we didn’t know them. 
If we didn’t possess a priori concepts, Kant maintains, experience would be 
impossible. Since we have experience, Kant reasons, we must possess a priori
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concepts. Likewise, Kant axgues that if we didn't have knowledge of a priori 
principles, we could have no knowledge whatsoever. But the fact that we do 
have knowledge proves, in Kant's view, that we know certain principles a 
priori. Unlike empiricists who attempt to show that the tasic principles 
of human knowledge, what Kant calls the principles of pure understanding, 
are a posteriori inductions from perceived phenomena, and unlike rationalists 
who attempt to show that the employment of pure reason can establish such 
principles a priori, Kant attempts to show that the validity of the prin­
ciples of pure understanding rests on the question of how knowledge is 
possible, and therefore, ultimately, on the question of how experience is 
possible. For Kant, the truth of a priori principles is proven neither by 
eiiq)irical induction nor by logical deduction, but by the alleged fact that 
without such principles knowledge would be impossible.
Thus Kant approaches the theory of knowledge from a perspective much 
different than the perspectives of rationalists euid empiricists. But the 
result of Kant's approach may be seen as a marriage of the two doctrines.
By positing space and time as subjective forms of intuition, instead of 
objective characteristics of the external world, by establishing the human 
understanding's necessary possession of a priori concepts, and by deriving 
a priori principles from showing the application of a priori concepts to 
the world of space and time, Kant is able to maintain with the empiricist 
that "all our knowledge begins with experience” (41), and with the ration­
alist that human beings can know synthetic a priori propositions. All 
knowledge, according to Kant, is relative to possible experience, that is 
to phenomena in space and time, but certain a priori concepts must be recog­
nized, and certain a priori principles must be known, in order to account
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for what Kant takes to be the obvious fact that we have knowledge of the 
world. Looking at the theory of knowledge from a unique jxjint of view,
Kant brings about a reconciliation of the two traditional theories of know­
ledge, rationalism and empiricism, which providesa.firm support to claims 
to knowledge of the phenomenal world, and which undermines claims to know­
ledge of objects beyond possible experience.
Kant's approach to the theory of knowledge from the standpoint of 
explaining the possibility of experience and the possibility of knowledge, 
and the results he derives from this approach, merits the attention of 
philosophers both because of the uniqueness of his approach, and because 
the results he derives are in accord with common notions of the kinds of 
things that can be known, and the kinds of things that cannot be known.
In ensuring the validity of knowledge gleaned from scientific investigation 
— a validity which, Kant feared, was seriously threaten! by the philosophy 
of David Hume — the Critical Philosophy supports the intellectual basis 
on which Western thought depends. In questioning the validity of knowledge 
which transcends experience, Kant sustains the view of those who consider, 
for example, questions about the existence of God and the immortality of 
the human soul beyond the realm of human knowledge, and more properly in 
the realm of faith. I hesitate to call this position of Kant's the "common- 
sense notion” of the powers and limits of knowledge, because I am not sure 
that sense can )be made of "commonsense notion," but I do think it safe to 
say that Kant's position is in accord with the view of many people, philo­
sophers and non-philosophers alike, that in general objects of experience 
are objects of knowledge, and objects which could not possibly be experi­
enced are not objects of knowledge. I also think that for this reason, 
and for the reason that Kant's position avoids the problem of too little
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knowledge that can be gained from a consistent application of the principles 
of empiricism, and the problem of too much knowledge that can be derived 
ftom the principles of rationalism, Kant's approach to the theory of know­
ledge rewards serious study.
Kant's theory of knowledge would be, of course, an incrdible feat were 
it without flaws, vdiich, unfortunately, it is not. Kant, I think, no more 
than Berkely whom he criticizes, can regard objects in space as more than 
"imaginary entities.” Objects in space and time, for Kant, have spatial 
and temporal characterictics only when they are perceived, because only 
then are the subjective forms of space and time imposed upon them. The 
unperceived object in Kant, as in Berkeley, cannot exist, or at least it 
cannot maintain its status as an object, the least that can be meant by which 
is a thing with spatial characteristics that persists through time. If I 
turn away from looking at my book, for example, my book, according to Kant's 
principles, must cease to exist as a book, for it loses all the properties 
familar to it, eg. having a soft cover, having small print, having a given 
number of pages, because all those properties depend on my book having spatial 
and temporal characteristics, vrfiich it ceases to have as soon as it ceases to 
be perceived. Vfhether the status of unperceived objects is a fatal flaw in 
Kant's philosophy I would not venture to say. It may well be, and it seems 
impossible to determine, that objects have no status qua object when they 
are not perceived. I would say, however, that Kant's idealism cannot be 
distinguished from Berkeley's idealism nearly as sharply as Kant thinks it 
can.
A more serious problem for Kant than the status of unperceived objects, 
however, is the crucial importance of the noumena to his system. Space and 
time and the Categories provide, according to Kant, only the forms of experi­
ence. They organize the manifold of intuition in ways intelligible to the
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human understanding, but they do not account for the presence of the manifold. 
Vfhat causes the manifold of intuition, the contents of appearances as opposed 
to their form, is a question which runs Kant into great difficulties. It 
is clear that, for Kant, the subjective constitution of the human mind is 
not responsible for the manifold of intuition, and while, for good reason, 
he avoids saying so explicitly, it is also clear that Kant thinks the con­
tent of appearances is caused by noumena.^ Indeed, short of claiming that 
the manifold of intuition is uncaused, Kant has little alternative than to 
attribute a causal role to noumena. If the existence of the manifold of 
intuition does not arise from the human mind, then that from which the man­
ifold does arise must exist independently of the forms imposed on the world 
by the mind, independently of space and time and the Categories — it must, 
in short, be noumenal. But in attributing existence and causality to noumenal 
objects Kant contradicts his own basic principle that the Categories are 
applicable only to phenomena. Kant is able to distinguish his idealism from 
Berkeley’s dictum, "existence is perception," only insofar as he attributes 
existence to the noumenal causes of appearances independently of the percep­
tion of those appearances, an attribution which violates one of the most basic 
principles of the Critical Philosophy by applying the category of Existence 
to something outside of the phenomenal world. That noumena exist as causal, 
agents is, I think, at once crucial to Kant’s system and contradictory of 
the principles of that system.
Ibe role of noumena in Kant is not limited to causing the content of 
appearances , however. The existence of a noumenal world is also crucial to 
Kant’s views on the problems of God, freedom, and immortality, problems which 
for Kant are the most important faced by philosophy. It is Kant's conviction,
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for example, that man is a free moral a^ent, but it is also his conviction 
that human freedom and universal causation are mutually exclusive. Since 
the principle of universal causation is true in the phenomenal world, it 
follows, Kant reasons, that freedom cannot exist unless there axe some human 
actions which are prompted by the noumenal self, the unknowable self beyond 
space and time, the self which is not constrained- by universal causation. 
Similarly, Kant employs the concept of noumena -bo justify his beliefs in 
God and the immortality of the soul. Although Kant*s use of the concept 
of noumena contradicts his own principles, his views on important philosophical 
questions, perhaps even the theory of knowledge presented in the Critique of 
Pure Reason, would be impossible without such a use.
Kant confesses that "my recollection of David Hume was the very thing
which...; first interrupted my dogmatic slumber and gave my investigations
0
in the field of speculative philosophy a quite new direction." The skeptical 
threat to his previous convictions forced Kant to reevaluate his position, 
and prompted the birth of the Critical Philosophy, a philosophy that he 
thought was a final and conclusive refutation of epistemological skepticism,
A refu-bation of skepticism Kant's philosophy is not, for it is no less open 
to skeptical doubts than other theories of knowledge, but it is an admirable 
and ingenious attempt to explain the possibility of knowledge, an attempt for 
which generations of philosophers have been and will be indebted to Kant. 
Kant's anxiety over the compelling arguments of Humean skepticism, and his 
tenacious endeavor that his convictions could be rationally justified, led 
to one of the most brilliant, if also one of the most obscure, contributions 
to the history of philosophy.
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I conclude my paper with a poem by D.H. Monro which seems to capture
concisely the essence of Kant's philosophy:
When Kant, aroused from his dogmatic dozes
And conscious of the very little room
For anti-skepticism left by Hume,
Decided that the intellect discloses.
Not what's out there, as everyone supposes.
But only what it finds it can subsume
Beneath the Categories (l assume
That they're like spectacles upon our noses)
He added that this blinkered human'll
Catch still some glimpses of the Noumenal
And that God, Freedom, Immortality
Are hall-marked; Guaranteed Reality
This simply shows what tangled webs we weave9When we are quite determined to believe.
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FOOTNOTES
1. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith,(New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965)# ?• 68.
All subsequent references to the Critique will be in parentheses 
following the quotation.
2. Kant divides the twelve pure concepts of understanding into four distinct types: of Quantity, of Quality, of Relation, and of Modality. The categories of Quantity include Unity, Plurality, and Totality? those of Quality are Reality, Negation, and Limit­ation; those of Relation are of Inherence and Subsistence, of Causality and Dependence, and of Community; and the categories
of Modality are Possibility-Impossibility, Existence-Non-Existence, 
and Necessity-Contingency.
3. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck, (Indianapolisl Bobbs-Merrill, 19W, P. 62.
4. "In all change of appearances substance is permanent; its quantum in nature is neither increased nor diminished”(Critique, P. 212).
5. ""All alterations take place in conformity with the law of the connection of cause and effect" (Critique, P. 218).
6. Prolegomena, P. 53*
7. Consider, for example, this passage: "The sensibility (and its field that of appearances) is itself limited by the inderstanding in sucha fashion that it does not have to do with things in themselves but only with the mode which, owing to our subjective constitution, they appear" (Critique, P. 269, my italics). One can find in Kant numerous passages like this one, where Kant carefully avoids saying explicitly that the noumena cause appearances, but where, in talking about the mode in which things in themselves (ie. noumena) appear, Kant leaves little doubt that he thinks noumena cause the manifold of intuition.
8. Prolegomena, P. 8.
9. Quoted from: John Lavely, "Comment on John N. Findlay, *The Central Role of the Thing-in-itself in Kant,'" The Philosophical Forum, Vol.13 (Fall 1981), P. 74.
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